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Abstract 
The paper contends that the economic growth process around the world has seen a growing 
dichotomy between real and financial sectors in the last four decades. There has been a 
marked stagnation in the real sector with falling growth and productivity levels, worsening 
physical investment and employment growth and dwindling saving rates. In contrast, the 
financial sector has seen a huge appreciation in financial assets and growing income from 
ownership of financial capital. The paper highlights the paradoxical coexistence of real sector 
stagnation with financial sector explosion.  
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The growing dichotomy between real and financial sectors 
Introduction  
In the last few years the world economy has faced arduous challenges on an unprecedented 
scale.  The year 2008-09 saw the world facing the worst possible recession since the Great 
Depression. The 2007 subprime crisis that hit the United States economy soon snowballed to 
a world-wide financial crisis and culminated finally in the global recession of 2008-09. The 
impact of the global recession of 2008-09 has been widespread, prolonged and devastating. 
According to the World Bank Global Economic Prospects (2010), global output contracted 
by 2.2 percent in 2009. While growth rates improved in 2010 and 2011, the pace of recovery 
remains highly uncertain.  Importantly, the World Bank Global Economic Prospects (Ibid) 
pointed out that the surge in capital flows in late 2009 (though they remain much lower than 
their 2008 levels), if sustained, could reinflate some of the asset bubbles in stock, currency, 
and real estate markets among developing countries. In contrast to the recovery in bond and 
equity markets, cross-border bank lending however remains weak as global banks lay stress 
on consolidation and deleveraging in an effort to rebuild their balance sheets. 
Food and fuel prices have been on the rise since 2006. The United Nations Report (2009, p.3) 
suggests that about 125 million people have been pushed into extreme poverty following the 
rise in food prices since 2006. The World Bank Global Economic Prospects (2010) suggests 
that the crisis will leave an additional fifty million people in extreme poverty in 2009 and 
some sixty-four million more in poverty by the end of 2010 relative to a no crisis scenario. 
While the severity of the economic crisis has hit the world economy hard, the premonition of 
the crisis was there for a considerable time. It is contended in the paper that the world 
economy has seen a paradoxical growth process in the last four decades with an increasing 
divergence between the real and financial sectors of the economy. There has been 
pronounced real sector stagnation with falling growth and productivity levels, worsening 
physical investment and employment growth and dwindling saving rates. In contrast, the 
  
financial sector has seen a huge appreciation in financial assets and growing income from 
ownership of financial capital. This paradoxical development is highlighted in this paper. 
The economic scenario of the post-Fordist era  
The Post-Fordist era economic scenario presets some sharp contrasts. On one hand, we see a 
stagnating real sector while on the other hand there is an exponentially growing financial 
sector. Economic theory assigns to finance a crucial role in fostering economic growth. 
Finance is believed to be the oil that lubricates the production process. While financial 
development is crucial for economic growth, it cannot act as a substitute for production of 
physical goods and services. Finance as a complement to real production activities can 
nurture growth but when the financial sector grows by itself beyond the needs of the real 
sector it suggests a speculative bubble. The economic growth process unfolding in the present 
decade in one in which the financial sector has assumed a life of its own. It is no longer 
constrained by the needs of the real sector nor is simply the complementary factor 
encouraging real sector growth. This is evidenced in the exponential growth of the financial 
sector even while the real sector has continued to stagnate amidst falling growth and 
productivity and declining physical investment the financial sector.  This paradoxical 
dichotomy between the real and financial sector is a distinct feature of the Post-Fordist era 
the main features of which is underlined below. 
Dwindling growth and productivity levels 
The Post World War II decades or what is oft called the ‘Golden Age of Modern Capitalism’ 
was characterized by high growth rates and productivity in most nations. However, a striking 
development since the late 1970s is the fall in growth rates. Maddison (2001, pp.125-126) 
estimated that the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from an average 4.91 
percent to 3.01 percent from 1950-73 to 1973-2001, while per-capita GDP fell from 2.93 
percent to 1.33 percent for the same time period. Again, except for a few Asian countries this 
alarming fall in growth rates was noted for most countries of the world. As shown in Table 
2.1 below, growth rates of both GDP and per-capital GDP in major regions have registered 
declines in the post 1970s period. Western Europe has seen a fall in GDP from 4.81 to 2.11 
percent and a similar fall from 4.03 to 2.98 is noted for Western off-shoots (the United States, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand). Japan has seen a pronounced fall in growth rate from 
9.29 percent to 2.97 percent and for Eastern Europe growth rates have turned negative to -
0.56 percent. A similar fall in per-capita Gross Domestic Product has been noted for Western 
  
and Eastern Europe, Former USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), United States, 
Latin America and Japan as seen in Table1 below. 
 
Maddison (2001, p.23) further pointed out that a third of the world’s population in counties of 
Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America and parts of Asia have experienced stark fall in 
incomes. While in Africa there has been no advance in per capita income in the past quarter 
century, in Eastern Europe and the former United States average per capita income in 1998 
had fallen to about three-quarters of that in 1973. Similarly, in Latin America and in many 
Asian countries, income gains have been a fraction of what they were in the golden era. 
While ‘Resurgent Asia3’ growth rates and per-capita incomes have registered a phenomenal 
rise since the 1970s as pointed out by Maddison (2001, pp.142-146), they have been marred 
by constant crisis since the late 1990s.  
China and India has in the last decade managed to achieve very high growth rates. However, 
the reduction of poverty and lessening of income inequality have been far less impressive. 
Bardhan (2010, p.6) has pointed out that the most impressive growth rates for China came in 
the period from 1973-1993 even though foreign trade and foreign investment increased only 
after the 1990s. The impressive growth in the 1973-1993 period is more attributable to 
internal factors rather than globalisation. Again, for India, Bardhan (Ibid) has contended that 
it is far from clear whether it is economic reforms of the last two decade that is responsible 
for the high growth rates achieved by the country. While reforms have made the Indian 
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 Resurgent Asia comprises of fifteen countries, i.e. China, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand,   Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, 
Burma and Nepal.  Maddison (2006), Ibid, p.146. 
Table 1  Growth of GDP and per capita GDP 
(Annual average growth rates) 
World and major regions 
GDP Per-capita GDP 
1950–73 1973-98 1950–73 1973-98 
Western Europe 4.81 2.11 4.08 1.78 
Western Offshoots 4.03 2.98 2.44 1.94 
Japan 9.29 2.97 8.05 2.34 
Asia (excluding Japan) 5.18 5.46 2.92 3.54 
Latin America 5.33 3.02 2.52 0.99 
Eastern Europe & former USSR 4.84 -0.56 3.49 -1.10 
Africa 4.45 2.74 2.07 0.01 
World 4.91 3.01 2.93 1.33 
Compiled from Maddison (2001), Ibid, Table 3–1a, p.126. 
 
  
corporate sector competitive, ninety-four percent of the Indian labour force works outside this 
sector. Again the rate of decline of poverty has not accelerated in the post reform period, i.e. 
1993-2005. In fact, for both the nations currently seen as the economic super-powers, 
inequality and consequent social discontent are seething below the surface. As Bardhan (Ibid) 
says – 
…those who envisage “billions of new capitalists” in China and India do not 
realize that hundreds of millions of poor people in both countries are currently 
scrounging a living from tiny family enterprises of extremely low 
productivity, and they don’t have access to credit, marketing, and 
infrastructure or the basic skills and education and risk-bearing capacity that 
can make a capitalist enterprise possible (Bardhan, 2010, p.7). 
The fall in growth and productivity levels has certainly been the most pronounced for 
developed nations. Several studies (Nordhaus,1982, 2004; Cullison, 1989; Wolff, 1997; 
Kozicki, 1997; Gordon, 1995, pp.141-145) have shown that there was a fall in both labor and 
total factor productivity levels during this period in different Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations compared to the preceding ‘Fordist’ era 
.Wolff (Ibid) pointed out that the annual rate of growth for labor productivity for the entire 
United States  economy fell from 1.8% per annum for the period 1958-67 to 0.9% per annum 
for the period 1967-77 and further to 0.7% per annum in 1977-87. Total Factor Productivity 
growth for the entire economy fell from 1.5% per annum in 1958-67 to 0.3% per annum in 
1967-77, showing no recovery in the period 1977-87 (Wolff, 1997, p.8). Cullison (Ibid, p.11) 
has shown that the same trend has been noted in all major OECD nations. 
Stagnating real sector and ‘jobless growth’ 
Eatwell and Taylor (2000), Panchmukhi (2000) and Crotty (2000) pointed out that there has 
been a marked stagnation in real wages and falling employment in the present era. Crotty 
(Ibid, p.6) pointed out that the unemployment rate in OECD countries increased from 3.2% in 
1960-73 to 5% in 1973-79 and further to 7.2% in 1979-89, falling marginally to 7.1% in 
1989-95. Crotty (2000, p.29) further gives evidence that the real compensation growth in 
nineteen developed countries (not including the United States) (after rising rapidly through 
the early 1970s), fell to 1.2% a year in 1979-89 and again to 0.7% in 1989-96. Alarmingly, 
the unprecedented technological progress following the Information Technology revolution 
was accompanied by a widening wage inequality (Greenwood, 1997, p.3). Panchmukhi 
  
(2000, p.6) characterized this period as ‘jobless growth’ highlighting the stark fall in 
employment in industrialized countries.   
Moreover real sector investment declined sharply after the 1970s. Crotty (2000. p.6) have 
presented calculations of the annual rate of growth of world real gross domestic investment 
based on World Bank data. The annual rate of growth of world real gross domestic 
investment stayed at 7.0% from 1966 to 1973 at the end of the Golden Age. It then fell 
sharply to 2.2% from 1974 to 1979; rose modestly to 2.8% from 1980 to 1989, then fell again 
to 2.7% from 1990 through 1996. Evidently, investment growth was especially sluggish in 
the developed world. The average annual growth rate of real gross capital formation for 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries fell from 6.3% 
in 1960-73 to1.5% in 1973-79. It improved somewhat to 2.4% in 1979-89, falling again 
to1.5% in 1989-95.  
Dwindling savings and rising indebtedness 
The falling investment in real sector in Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) nations is coupled with declining household saving rates in these 
countries. As pointed out by Harvey (2004), net household saving ratios have been declining 
for the Euro area, United States and Japan over the 1990s and early 2000s.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 shows Household Saving Rates for select OECD nations over the period 1990 to 
2005. As may be seen, household savings rates have fallen drastically over this period for 
most of these countries.  
Table 2  Household Saving Rates in Select OECD countries 
                                                            (Percent of Disposable Household Income) 
Year 1990 1995 1999 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Net Savings 
Australia 8.2 6.4 1.9 -2.3 -3.3 -2.6 -1.1 
Canada 13.0 9.2 4.0 3.5 2.6 2.9 1.6 
Japan 13.9 11.9 10.0 4.9 3.9 3.5 3.9 
United States 7.0 4.6 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.1 0.5 
France 9.4 12.8 12.1 13.8 12.7 12.6 11.8 
Gross Savings 
United Kingdom 8.0 10.2 5.3 5.0 4.9 3.7 5.6 
Compiled from OECD Economic Outlook 83Database, Annex Table 23 
  
Again, Household debt has increased to record levels in a number of OECD countries. 
Girouard, Kennedy and André (2006, p.6) show total household borrowing, as a proportion of 
GDP, has increased considerably – debt levels ranging from below forty percent of GDP in 
Italy to above hundred percent in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark. 
Stockhammer (2008, pp.6-8) have pointed out that most European nations have experienced 
rising debt ratios since 1995 as shown in Table 3. Van Treeck (2009, p.474) have shown for 
the United States there has been a fall in savings rate coupled with a rapid increase in both 
household wealth and indebtedness since the 1970s. 
 
The explosive financial sector growth 
On the financial side, again, the single most key factor affecting the developments over this 
period is the unprecedented growth of financial markets, and consequent financialisation. The 
world economic order has been characterized by an enormous growth of financial markets 
and commodities since the 1980s. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996, p.1) has shown that 
between 1982 and 1993 stock market capitalization grew an average 15 percent a year from 
$2 trillion to $10 trillion. A disproportionate amount of this growth was in emerging stock 
markets. For emerging markets, stock market capitalization increased from three percent to 
fourteen percent in the same period. Schmidt (2002, p.17) has pointed out that there has been 
an increasing globalization of the financial markets, with international bank lending 
increasing from $265 billion in 1975 to $4.2 trillion in 1995. Private capital flows that were 
insignificant in 1960s increased to $890 billion in net new issues of international loans and 
bonds in 1997. Moreover, there has been the rise of a new-more demanding and powerful, 
institutional investor in this decade. Institutional investors (mainly pension funds, mutual 
Table 3  Household Debt in select OECD countries 
                              (Percent of disposable income) 
Country 1995 
2000 2005 
Germany 97 
111 107 
France 66 
78 
 
89 
 
United Kingdom 116 
 
118 
 
158 
 United States 93 
107 135 
Japan 113 
136 132 
Note:  (a) Data for Denmark, Spain and Japan refer to 2004 rather than 2005. 
 (b) Germany refers to West-Germany before 1991 
Compiled from: Stockhammer, 2008, Ibid, p.21. 
  
funds and insurance companies) expanded by seventeen percent between 1981 and 1991 to 
reach $3500 billion in Europe and expanded by fifteen percent to reach $6400 billion in 
North America. Even more surprising is the growth of the second-generation financial 
commodities, which have little basis in real sector activities. Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) (2009) statistics show that there had been an astounding growth of the 
amounts outstanding of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives since the late 1990s. Aptly, 
Crotty (2007, p.4) has named the present age as the ‘Golden Age of Finance’.
‘Financialisation’ and its consequences 
Evidently, a defining character of the growth scenario since the 1970s has been the increased 
importance of financial sector of the economy relative to the non-financial sectors termed in 
economic literature as the ‘financialisation’ of the economy (Van Treeck, 2009, p.467; 
Stockhammer, 2004, p.720). Stockhammer (2004, p.720) includes in the process broadly “the 
globalization of financial markets, the shareholder value revolution and the rise of incomes 
from financial investment”. ‘Financialisation’ by shifting the balance of power to the owners 
of financial capital in the corporate world has had a crucial impact on corporate governance 
and labor relations. ‘Shareholder value revolution’, defined as the increased dominance of 
shareholders over management and workers in corporate governance, leads to a corporate 
restructuring and shift in management priorities (Stockhammer, 2004; Van Treeck, 2009). 
Moreover, as Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000, p.18) point out a high dividend payout ratio 
leads to a shift to a policy of ‘downsize and distribute’, as opposed to a strategy of ‘retain and 
invest’ that has been traditionally favored by managements.  
There has been an increasing gap between manager wages and blue-collar wages. Piketty and 
Saez (2003, pp.31-32) have shown that wage inequality for the United States economy, as 
measured by top fractile wage shares, started to increase since the 1970s. The top one percent 
share increased from 5 percent to 7.5 percent from 1970 to 1984. From 1986 to 1988 the top 
shares of wage earners increased more sharply with the top one percent share jumping from 
7.5 percent to 9.5 percent. From 1988 to 1994, top wage remained somewhat constant, but 
increased again from 1994 to 1998, with the top one percent wage share increasing from 9 
percent to 11 percent.  
Van Treeck (2009, pp.469-470) has also highlighted two well established stylized facts that 
provide evidence of the fact that the shareholder revolution has indeed curbed the 
managements desire to accumulate physical capital–– first, there has been an increase in 
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firms’ dividend payout ratio along with a strong positive correlation between the availability 
of internal sources of finance and physical investment and second, there has been a declining, 
role of the stock market for providing investment finance to firms. 
Stockhammer (2004, p.11) has shown that over the past two decades, in fact, the financial 
investments of non-financial businesses have been increasing resulting in a slowdown in 
accumulation of physical assets. In the major economies (Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom as well as the United States), the investment to profit ratio has shown a clear 
declining trend. Again, there has been increasing evidence that gross fixed capital formation 
as percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in major industrialized countries fell since the 
late 1970s (Navarro,V., Schmitt, J. & Austudillo, J , 2004,  p.150). This is shown in Table 4. 
 
A closely related development has been the rise in rentier incomes over this period. Power, 
Table 4   Gross capital formation in select OECD Countries  
(as percent of GDP) 
Country 1960-73 1974-79 1980-89 1990-99 
France 23.8 24.2 21.7 19.6 
Germany 24.6 21.2 20.8 22.5 
Canada 21.8 23.5 21.7 18.9 
United Kingdom 22.4 20.1 18.5 17.1 
United States 18.4 19.4 19.2 17.7 
Note: Compiled from Navarro, Schmitt & Astudillo (2004), Ibid, p.150 
Table 4   Rentier Income Share (Not Including Capital Gains) in Select OECD 
 Countries, 1960-2000                         
                  (Decade average percent of GDP) 
Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Decadal Change 
 R* NF* R* NF* 
R*  NF* R* NF* R* NF* 
Australia 6.67 12.66 7.92 8.10 14.50 5.24 12.97 7.91 88.40 -26.76 
France –– –– 6.24 6.39 10.62 5.97 21.19 11.07 155.0 23.25 
Japan 9.00 11.96 12.30 9.02 14.27 9.91 11.22 8.25 19.70 -12.54 
UK 3.97 14.82 6.33 13.45 10.85 15.83 14.16 15.95 143.0 16.19 
USA 14.81 11.31 22.47 10.65 38.26 12.18 33.49 9.97 92.40 0.89 
Note :  R*= Rentier Income Share, NF*= Non-Financial Income Share  
 Decadal changes are over 1960s/1970s and 1980s/1990s 
Source:  Compiled from Power et al, 2003 (Table III.1.1 p.6) 
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Epstein, and Abrena (2003, p.70) have shown that rentier shares increased dramatically in 
most countries between the first two decades and the second two decades of the period from 
1960-2000. Table 4 complied from Power et al. (Ibid) shows the Rentier Income Shares for 
the period 1960-2000 for select OECD Countries clearly shows this trend 
The tremendous growth in the derivatives market also underline the accumulation of financial 
capital. Crotty (2007, pp.6-7) has pointed out that large financial institutions have raised 
profits by taking larger risks that all more often located off-the-balance sheet, trading in an 
increasingly complex set of derivative instruments. They have been able to achieve high 
margins on much of this business by selling the bulk of their products over-the-counter 
(OTC) rather than on exchanges, thus insulating the profit margin from destructive 
competition All this point to the massive accumulation that have taken place. The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (United States) reports that in 2006, the seven largest 
commercial banks held 98% of the industry’s derivatives.  
Not surprisingly, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives have grown at an astounding pace since 
the 1990s. In 1992, the notional amount of global OTC derivatives was $25 trillion, which 
had reached $72 trillion in mid 1998; by mid 2001 it was $98 trillion and in mid 2006 it was 
$370 trillion. Credit default swaps increased from $180 billion in 1996 to $2 trillion in 2002 
and further to $20 trillion in 2006. Again, OTC interest rate derivatives increased from $70 
trillion in 2000 to $262 trillion in 2006 (Crotty, 2007, pp.31-32). The unprecedented growth 
of financial commodities underlines the tremendous accumulation process set up in the 
economic system. This growth in financial assets has come despite the stagnation in the real 
sector which makes it all the more significant. It evidently points out this accumulation of 
financial commodities has little basis in real sector growth and surely is not catered for real 
sector investment. Finance today has far surpassed any need of the real sector and assumed an 
extraordinary growth process of its own. 
Financial sector explosion, crisis and the real sector slowdown 
The economic scenario of the last four decades is also distinctive if we consider the 
frequency of crises that has affected the world over this period. The trend that began with the 
collapse of the par value system in early 1970s was followed by the oil-price crises, EMS 
crisis of 1992-93 and the Tequila crisis of 1994-95. The string of crises continued with South-
East Asian crises of 1997, the Brazilian crisis of 1998-9, the “Dot-com Bubble” crash in 
2000, United States sub-prime crises of 2007-08, to the global recession of 2008-09. As 
                                                                 
                                                                                                                                          1  
                                                  
Bordo, Eichegreen, Kingebiel and Soledad (2000, p.27) and Panchmukhi (2000) have pointed 
out the frequency of financial crises has evidently increased in the current period. Eatwell and 
Taylor (2000, pp.5-6) has also underlined the fact that the new international financial order 
that emerged since the 1980s, is not only characterized by an enormous volume of trading in 
financial assets, but also a financial system that is more and more susceptible to financial 
fragility.  
The financialisation of the economy has a significant impact on the real sector stagnation. 
Stockhammer (2004) has shown that financialisation over the last two decades has resulted in 
slowdown of physical asset accumulation and increasing financial investments by non-
financial businesses. Further, the shareholder revolution has led to a reduction in the growth 
desired by the firms, as shareholders are keener on raising profits as opposed to managers 
who focus more on growth. As shareholder revolution includes a market for corporate control 
(including the possibility of firing managers and performance related pay-packages), 
management becomes keener to adopt policies closer to shareholders objectives of increased 
profitability leading to lower real sector investment activity, for the low profit rates in real 
sector in most industries most of the time, and with existence of by excess capacity. 
In identifying the causes on the 2008-09 crises, Baily & Elliott (2011) pointed out that the 
financial meltdown witnessed has an origin in the asset price bubble brought about by newer 
kinds of financial innovation that helped to mask risk and supervisors and regulators who 
failed to curb excessive risk-taking. While securitization process was seen as a solution to the 
problem of balance sheet management by banks, this process itself had a key role in creation 
of more and more complex financial instruments and led to financial markets turning more 
risky and opaque. Eatwell and Taylor (2000, pp.99-100) pointed out that while derivatives are 
meant to hedge risks and promote the flow of private capital, they are perfect vehicles for 
speculation, besides helping to escape regulatory safeguards, circumvent accounting rules and 
evade taxation. Dodd (2002) has shown that derivatives played a key destructive role in the 
1997 East-Asian crisis. They not only made the economies more susceptible to crisis, but also 
hastened and intensified the downturn once it started. Thus, the increasing financial crisis and 
fragility during this period has a basis in the finance-dominated economic regime that has 
emerged. Moreover, the heightened instability of global financial markets has significantly 
increased the incidence of banking and currency crises, which culminated to serious 
recessions in the areas in which they occur (Crotty, 2000, p.30).  
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Conclusion 
The analysis in the above sections clearly has shown that one of the key aspects affecting the 
economic scenario over the last few decades is the unprecedented expansion of financial 
capital. It is this accumulation that is reflected in the expansion of financial markets and 
commodities, appreciation of financial assets and rising rentier shares. The analysis of 
financialisation in literature gives evidence that the accumulation of financial capital has also 
had a major impact on the real sector. Financialisation and shareholder revolution has not 
only led to slowdown of physical capital accumulation that is crucial for attaining real 
growth; but also led to a deterioration of labor relations, employment and real compensation. 
In fact, we can identify the accumulation of financial capital as the underlying feature that has 
impacted the developments of the present epoch.  
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